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INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys developing issues in the
administration of tribal reserved water rights.  At the
center of the issues is the McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C. § 666 (1988).  The McCarran Amendment was
enacted to waive federal sovereign immunity for the
adjudication and administration of federal water rights.
The sponsors believed that administration should be
undertaken by state administrative bodies.  
Historically, there has been tension between rights
acquired under the state law of prior appropriation and
federal tribal water rights.  The tension arises from the
fact that tribal claims are being quantified in stream
systems that are fully appropriated under state law.
Administrative issues will develop under that tension.
Administrative issues may be divided into two categories:
priority enforcement and changes in use of tribal water
rights.  This paper shall address issues in the latter
category, focusing on the extent to which state substantive
law is applicable to tribal water rights which are changed
in purpose or place of use from primary reservation
purposes.  Specific questions include:  
• Can an adjudicated Winters right be changed in
purpose or place of use?
• Does a change in use to a secondary purpose subject
a Winters right to state jurisdiction and state law?
• What administrative issues arise if a "change in
use," "transfer," or "lease" takes the form of tribal
forbearance from developing its reserved rights,
leaving non-Indian development in place?  
Underlying these issues is the waiver of sovereign
immunity brought about by the McCarran Amendment,
and the extent to which the procedures and principals of
state law are applicable to federal tribal water rights.
Only one case, In Re Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d
273 (Wyo. 1992), has directly addressed the transfer of
adjudicated tribal water rights to other purposes.  Some
administrative questions are being resolved through
negotiated settlements for tribal claims, although the use
of imported water in settlements is deferring decision on
difficult issues.
Settlements with marketing provisions reflect an interest
in tribal water by state parties.  While not governed by the
McCarran Amendment, this dynamic will continue.  The
leasing or marketing of tribal rights off-reservation is
increasingly desirable to industry and other state entities
as:
• a source of water;
• a source of water with an early priority date; and
• freedom from elements of state regulation. 
STATE AND TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS
Prior to 1866 rights to the use of water on the public
domain were retained by the United States.  However,
"[t]he rule generally recognized throughout the states and
territories of the arid region was that the acquisition of
water by prior appropriation for a beneficial use was
entitled to protection . . .."1  See California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
154 (1935).  Between 1850-1875 the appropriation
doctrine was recognized in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Wyoming.
As a result of the Public Land Acts of 1866 and 1870, and
the Desert Land Act of 1877, ownership of the United
States in the non-navigable waters was severed from the
public domain.  Rights which had developed under
appropriation practice and custom were confirmed.2   See
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S.
690, 702-09 (1899).  The Desert Land Act of 1877, 19
Stat. 377, expressly relinquished plenary control over
water resources on the public domain to the states.  It
provided that " . . . all surplus water over and above such
actual appropriation and use, together with the water of
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all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon
the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be
held free for the appropriation and use of the public ... ."
See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935):
What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if
not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of
the public domain became publici juris, subject to
the plenary control of the designated states,
including those since created out of the territories
named, with the right in each to determine for
itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or
the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain.  295 U.S. at 163-64.  
The severance of the non-navigable waters from the
public domain contained an important omission.  No
provision had been made for the use of water in federal
enclaves.  This issue was not addressed until 1908 when
the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908), holding that when the United States
withdrew lands from the public domain in order to
establish the Ft. Belknap Indian Reservation, it also
impliedly withdrew from the then unappropriated waters
of the Milk River sufficient water to satisfy the purposes
for which the lands were withdrawn.  207 U.S. at 577.
The consequence of the Winters doctrine was two-fold.
First, federal law impliedly reserved unappropriated
water from appropriation under state and territorial law
upon the withdrawal of lands from the public domain by
the United States.  The reservation was "implied" because
federal documents creating the reservation of land were
silent as to water.3  Second, in many stream systems two
distinct bodies of law governing water use have
developed, complicating the administrative issues.
The quantification of federal reserved rights is
undertaken according to federal law.  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court is cognizant of the impact of large
reservations of water "[i]n the arid parts of the West
...[where] claims to water for use on federal reservations
inescapably vie with other public and private claims for
the limited quantities to be found in the rivers and
streams." See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,
699 (1978).   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has established the
principle that quantification of federal reserved rights is
limited to the primary purposes of the reservation.  In 
United States v. New Mexico, supra, Justice Rehnquist
stated: "Each time this Court has applied the `implied-
reservation-of-water doctrine,' it has carefully examined
both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for
which the land was reserved, and concluded that without
the water the purposes of the reservation would be
entirely defeated."  See United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. at 700.  The Court held that any secondary uses were
subject to state law:  "Where water is only valuable for a
secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the
contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent
with its other views, that the United States would acquire
water in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator."  438 U.S. at 702.  See California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
The scope of the Winters doctrine was summarized in
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) as
follows:
This Court has long held that when the Federal
Government withdraws its land from the public
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.  In so
doing the United States acquires a reserved right
in unappropriated water which vests on the date of
the reservation and is superior to the rights of
future appropriators.  Reservation of water rights
is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, §
8, which permits federal regulation of navigable
streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3,
which permits federal regulation of federal lands.
The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and
other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights
in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
Tribal reserved rights and water rights arising under state
law differ in fundamental respects.  Water rights arising
under state law are usufructuary rights subject to
administrative regulation that requires, as a condition for
ownership, application to beneficial use.  A typical
provision of state law reads:  "Beneficial use shall be the
basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of
water."  See, e.g., N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 3; Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 533.035; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-141(B).  The
requirement of continuous beneficial use is enforced by
forfeiture and abandonment law.4  Tribal reserved water
rights arise from federal law.  Reserved rights used on
reservations do not require actual use to be maintained.5
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THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT
The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988), was
enacted in 1952 to integrate federal water rights with
state rights through the adjudication process and in
subsequent administration under state law.  The rationale
for the McCarran Amendment was set forth in S. Rep.
No. 755, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).  The Statement of
Purpose clearly provides for a waiver of sovereign
immunity for the dual purposes of adjudication and
administration:
The purpose of the proposed legislation, as
amended, is to permit the joinder of the United
States as a party defendant in any suit for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source or for the administration of
such rights where it appears that the United States
is the owner or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by
purchase, exchange, or otherwise and that the
United States is a necessary party to such suit.
In S. Rep. No. 755, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951), the
Senate Judiciary Committee outlined the need for the
waiver on the basis of the requirement for state
jurisdiction over both federal rights and rights acquired
under the prior appropriation doctrine.  The Committee
Report begins with the distinction between water rights
acquired under the state law of prior appropriation and
water rights owned by the United States.  It reviews the
congressional history of federal deference to state water
law.  The Committee observed that "[i]n the
administration of and the adjudication of water rights
under State law the State courts are vested with the
jurisdiction necessary for the proper and efficient
disposition thereof, and by reason of the interlocking of
adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights.
Accordingly all water users on a stream, in practically
every case, are interested and necessary parties to any
court proceedings."  Id. at 4-5.  The Committee went on
to conclude that "[i]t is apparent that if any water user
claiming to hold such right by reason of the ownership
thereof by the United States . . . is permitted to claim
immunity from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such
claims could materially interfere with the lawful and
equitable use of water . . . by the other water users who
are amenable to and bound by the decrees and order of
the State courts."  Id. at 5.  The Committee described this
situation as one that "cannot help but result in a chaotic
condition."  Id.  Accordingly, the Committee sought the
waiver of federal sovereign immunity for joinder of the
United States to state court and administrative
proceedings:
Since it is clear that the States have the
control of the water within their boundaries, it is
essential that each and every owner along a given
water course, including the United States, must
be amenable to the law of the State, if there is to
be a proper administration of the water law as it
has developed over the years.
S. Rep. No. 755, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1951).
This point was emphasized in the congressional debate.
The Government has long recognized and
conceded, particularly in the Desert Land Act of
1877, the supremacy of State law in respect to the
acquisition of water.  It has been under these State
laws that the water rights of the owners on a given
stream have been adjudicated.  Under the laws of
many States, in order that an adjudication of the
water rights of a stream may be had, it is necessary
to join all the parties owning or claiming to own
any rights to the stream.  If one or the other of the
owners of the rights cannot be joined, the effect of
the decree is obvious.  Since the United States has
not waived its immunity in cases of this nature,
suits for the adjudication of water rights
necessarily come to a standstill, and confusion
results.
97 CONG. REC. 12947-48 (1951).  A proposed
amendment to permit the United States to remove an
adjudication brought in state court to federal court was
stricken.  97 CONG. REC. 7817 (1951).
Judicial constructions of the McCarran Amendment have
enforced the federal waiver of sovereign immunity.  The
policy for state adjudication of federal water rights was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).  At issue were proceedings brought by the
United States in federal court on behalf of Indian
claimants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345.  The Court
acknowledged the "highly interdependent" nature of
rights to water, and that "actions seeking the allocation of
water essentially involve the disposition of property and
are best conducted in unified proceedings."  424 U.S. at
819.  The Court concluded that "[t]he consent to
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jurisdiction given by the McCarran Amendment bespeaks
a policy that recognizes the availability of comprehensive
state systems for adjudication of water rights as the means
for achieving these goals."  Id.  The Court held that the
suit brought by the United States in federal court was
properly dismissed in favor of the concurrent adjudication
addressing the same issues in state court.  
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545
(1983), the Supreme Court decided the effect of the
McCarran Amendment on proceedings in states which
were admitted to the Union subject to legislation that
reserved absolute jurisdiction and control over Indian
lands to the Congress.  The Court considered the
consolidated San Carlos cases to be a sequel to the
decision in Colorado River Water Conservation District,
supra.  At issue was the contention that the McCarran
Amendment did not effect a waiver of federal sovereign
immunity with respect to Arizona's Enabling Act, 36
Stat. 557, and the Arizona Constitution, Art. 20, ¶ 4.  The
Court held that limitations imposed on state court
jurisdiction by the Enabling Acts were removed by the
McCarran Amendment which was intended to address
the problem that federal sovereign immunity placed on a
state's ability to adjudicate water rights.  The Court
concluded that where state courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate Indian water rights, concurrent suits brought
by Indian tribes seeking the adjudication of their rights
are subject to dismissal under the Colorado River
doctrine.  463 U.S. at 565-570.
ADMINISTRATION
Under the law of most western states, the administration
of water rights is conducted by the office of the State
Engineer with enforcement in the state courts when
necessary.  In a majority of western states, "the water
rights statutes provide for making changes in both place
and purpose of use of appropriated water."  See 1 W. A.
HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 633 (1971).  "In most
instances, approval of the State administrative agency is
required."  Id.   Transactions with state rights are subject
to a body of administrative law containing criteria
designed to prevent the impairment of other water rights,
and to protect the state interest in public welfare and the
conservation of water.6 
In the ordinary circumstance, administrative issues arise
when a water right owner seeks to change the point of
diversion, purpose or place of use of a perfected water
right.  Unperfected or inchoate rights are generally not
transferrable under state law because a "transfer" of an
inchoate right would effectuate a new appropriation in the
guise of the transfer.  The usual circumstance with
respect to a transfer of an Indian water right, however,
may prove to be different if what is "leased" is the right
of non-federal water users to develop an inchoate reserved
right, or a covenant by a tribe not to develop the right.
There has been consensus on the need for unified
principles of administration.  In United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth
Circuit cautioned against the "legal confusion that would
arise if federal water law and state water law reigned side
by side in the same locality."  736 F.2d at 1365, citing
FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).  However,
what constitutes unified administration, particularly in
terms of the application of state substantive law to tribal
rights, has never been fully explored, and is only now
being addressed.
DEVELOPING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
Two cases have addressed the administration of federal
reserved rights under the McCarran Amendment.  In
United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1
(Colo. 1983), the Colorado Supreme Court decided
appeals from decrees entered in Colorado water courts
with respect to federal reserved rights incident to lands
for forests and national monuments.  The Court held that
the McCarran Amendment recognized "the primacy of
the western states' interests in regulating and
administering water rights."  656 P.2d at 9.  The Court
upheld the United States' stipulation that if a change of
use or change in point of diversion was sought, Colorado
law was to be followed, and that the Colorado State
Engineer had administrative jurisdiction over the rights.
656 P.2d at 35.  The issue of whether a change could be
made only to another valid reservation purpose was
deferred.
The issue of whether a tribe has administrative
jurisdiction to change the purpose of use of tribal reserved
rights was reached for the first and only time by a court
in the Big Horn adjudication.  Reserved water rights were
quantified for the existing and future agricultural
purposes of the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes in In Re
Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P. 2d 76
(Wyo. 1988).  The Court utilized the standard of
practicably irrigable acres, adopted from Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).7  On April 12, 1990, the
Wind River Water Resources Control Board issued
Instream Flow Permit 90-001 which authorized the Joint
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Business Council "to dedicate 252 c.f.s. (well, surface,
spring) water in the Wind River for the purpose(s) of
fisheries, restoration and enhancement, recreational uses,
ground water recharge, downstream benefits to irrigators
and other water users."  At issue was the transfer of an
unperfected award of water for future irrigation purposes
into a present instream flow, posing the issue of principal
concern to users of water based on state permits.
Following a district court's decision that the Tribes were
entitled to change their reserved water right without
regard to Wyoming water law, the decision was appealed
to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  In In Re Big Horn
River System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992), the Wyoming
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether "the Tribes
may change their right to divert future project water for
agricultural purposes to a right to maintain an instream
flow for fishery purposes without regard to Wyoming
water law . . .."  835 P.2d at 275.  The Court employed
the case of United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978), to hold:
We are persuaded by United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052
(1978), wherein the United States Supreme Court
held that water is impliedly reserved only to the
extent necessary to meet the primary purpose(s) for
which a reservation is made and that, where water
is valuable for a secondary purpose, the inference
arises that Congress intended for water to be
acquired in the same manner as is employed by
any other private or public appropriation.
* * *
We see no reason why this rationale should not
apply to a change of use of the future project water
acquired by the Tribes solely for agricultural
purposes.  We hold that the Tribes, like any other
appropriator, must comply with Wyoming water
law to change the use of their reserved future
project water from agricultural purposes to any
other beneficial use.  We leave for another day the
question of whether the Tribes may dedicate their
historically used water to instream flow, as that
issue is not directly presented for our review by the
facts of this case.  835 P.2d at 278-279.
Implicit in the decision is the state law principle that an
inchoate or unperfected right cannot be changed in
purpose or place of use.  This was the basis for a
concurring opinion by Justice Cardine who stated "that
future water may not be transferred to instream flow
without first being put to beneficial use for irrigation
purposes."  835 P.2d at 285-86.  His primary concern was
"that the change of use must be orderly and gradual so as
to minimize the devastating effect of an enormous
dedication to instream flow of water that has never
before, and is not now, being used for beneficial
purposes."  Id. at 287.
Accordingly, the Big Horn Court affirmed three
principles:  (i) that Winters rights may be changed in
purpose and place of use; (ii) that the change be made
under state administration; and (iii) employ certain
principles of state law.  The concern for dislocation to
existing economies based on state permits was shown in
Justice Cardine's opinion.
Apart from the McCarran Amendment, settlement
agreements with marketing provisions have provided a
means of establishing administration through negotiation,
although they vary with respect to administrative
provisions.8  The Arizona model provides the most
comprehensive statewide system.  The principal
administrative issue will be challenges to the restriction
as to place of use of leased water.  This is presently at
issue in the Gila River negotiations.  Several examples
follow.
The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, 96
Stat. 1274, 1280 provides for off-reservation uses of water
including (for the Papago Tribe, now the Tohono
O'Odham Tribe):  "agricultural, municipal, industrial,
commercial, mining, or recreational use whether within
or outside the Papago Reservation so long as such use is
within the Tucson Active Management Area . . .."  The
limitation of use to the Tucson Active Management Area
conforms to an agreement to diminish groundwater
pumping in the Tucson Active Management area in
return for supply by the Tribe.  Administration is
addressed at § 303 (a) (3) where the tribe is to develop a
water management plan which " . . . will have the same
effect as any management plan developed under Arizona
law."  Some 40,000-60,000 acre-feet of CAP water have
been made available to the Tribe.  No leases of water have
been made as yet.
The Ak-Chin Settlement Act as amended, 106 Stat. 3258,
contains a similar leasing provision, and a place of use
limitation to the Pinal, Phoenix, and Tucson Active
Management Areas.  This is the CAP service area.  Some
75,000 acre-feet of CAP water was made available to the
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Ak-Chin Tribe.  10,000 acre-feet have been leased to a
developer.  
The Fort McDowell Settlement Act, 104 Stat. 4480,
provides for a lease of water to the City of Phoenix
utilizing 10,000-15,000 acre-feet of CAP water.  There is
a place of use limitation in § 407 (f) to Pima, Pinal, and
Maricopa Counties, the CAP service area.  The Yavapai-
Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement, 108 Stat.
4526, is similar, and provides for a lease of water to
Prescott of some 3,000-4,000 acre-feet of water.  
Finally, an important issue will develop with respect to
tribal forbearance or "deferral agreements."  There is a
distinction between "legally" undeveloped water and
water that is in fact undeveloped.  For example, by the
middle 1950s, the surface and interrelated ground water
supplies of the Rio Grande were fully appropriated.  The
Winters doctrine, however, allows a shift in the point in
time when water is theoretically available to be
appropriated.  If an Indian reservation was reserved from
the public domain in 1873, the water needed to fill the
Indian right would derive in legal theory from the waters
unappropriated as of 1873.  Given the fact that the waters
of the Rio Grande were fully appropriated under state law
by the middle 1950s, any use of an Indian right to Rio
Grande waters, quantified now, is a right to use already
appropriated waters.
As a result, in a fully appropriated stream system, and
from the tribal perspective, the leasable commodity is the
forbearance to develop the right, thus facilitating
neighboring non-Indian use.  Some tribes take even a
stronger territorial position, arguing that existing non-
Indian use is in reality a use of unperfected Indian water,
and the saleable commodity becomes the agreement not
to seek to enjoin the non-Indian use.  In either case, the
thing being "leased" is not an existing use of wet water,
but the right to use legally undeveloped tribal water.
Depending on the facts, the parties to a lease agreement
could fashion
 a lease to preclude administration, or employ negotiated
administrative criteria.
CONCLUSIONS
The McCarran Amendment waived federal sovereign
immunity for the adjudication of federal water rights.  It
provided for a unified administration of federal rights,
including tribal reserved water rights, under state
administrative authority.  The greatest uncertainty is the
applicable substantive law, particularly the extent to
which the substantive law of the states, i.e. prior
appropriation law, will be applied to adjudicated tribal
rights which are changed in purpose or place of use from
the primary reservation purpose.  The scanty case law to
date suggests the application of some state law concepts.
Two policies are at work in this developing area of law.
The principal policy issue is the dislocation of economies
based on permits and licenses granted under state law
which fosters resistance to tribal claims.  A
countervailing trend exists in the increased interest of
some state parties in tribal water.  Settlement agreements
are responding to this need with marketing provisions
which enable administrative issues to be determined in
negotiations.
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